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CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS: 
THE CHILD’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 




When judges sentence people to prison, and when prison 
administrators determine visitation policies, minor children are often 
ignored.1  This is not an obscure issue but rather has significant, daily 
ramifications for a generation of American youth.  As incarceration rates 
have spiraled by over 500% in the last thirty years,2 so have the number of 
children who have lost parents to the prison system.3  In fact, in the United 
States, there are more children with incarcerated parents than there are 
people in prison.4
 
* Chesa Boudin is a third year law student at Yale University.  Special thanks to 
Professor Judith Resnik for her guidance and feedback throughout the research and writing 
of this Article.  Thanks also to Professor Philip Genty, Aileen Campbell, Theresa Miguel, 
Ashley Waddell, and my mother, Kathy Boudin. 
  Incarcerating parents of minor children is not just an 
issue for those sentenced to prison; the practice also generates third party 
harms for the children, their caregivers, the welfare apparatus of the state, 
1 See generally NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE 
INCARCERATED (2005) (detailing the plight of children with incarcerated parents); CHILDREN 
OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995) (providing 
guidance to social workers, caregivers, and others who work with children of incarcerated 
parents). 
2 The Sentencing Project News—Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 (last visited Oct. 29, 2010); see 
also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, Correctional Population Trends Chart, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/corr2.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
3 LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1–2 (2008), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. 
4 Id. at 1. 
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the prison system, and the law.5  Specifically, parental incarceration has 
implications for myriad legal issues related to custody,6 communication,7 
visitation,8 conditions of confinement,9 international standards,10 and 
more.11  Studying parental incarceration through a legal frame of analysis 
may shed light on, or at least raise revealing questions about, the children 
left behind.  While there is a body of literature on the social issues 
presented by parental incarceration12 and an assortment of services and 
programs offered for children and families of prisoners,13
 
5 See generally RENNY GOLDEN, WAR ON THE FAMILY: MOTHERS IN PRISON AND THE 
FAMILIES THEY LEAVE BEHIND (2005) (analyzing collateral impacts of mass incarceration); 
CHILDREN WITH PARENTS IN PRISON: CHILD WELFARE POLICY, PROGRAM, & PRACTICE ISSUES 
(Cynthia Seymour & Creasie Finney Hairston eds., 2001) (discussing permanency planning, 
best interests of the child, and child welfare policy); BARBARA BLOOM & DAVID STEINHART, 
WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? (1993) (considering the roles and responsibilities of child 
welfare agencies, corrections, caregivers, and incarcerated mothers). 
 there is 
6 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (requiring a clear and 
convincing standard of evidence before terminating petitioners’ parental rights); Mariely 
Downey, Losing More than Time: Incarcerated Mothers and the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act of 1997, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 45 (2000) (detailing the impact of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act on termination of parental rights of the incarcerated). 
7 See, e.g., Walton v. N.Y. Dep’t Corr. Serv., 13 N.Y.3d 475, 494 (2009) (upholding 
prison phone policies). 
8 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 126–27 (2003) (upholding department of 
corrections policies severely limiting prison visitation by children of inmates). 
9 See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 576–77 (1984) (addressing a challenge to 
pretrial conditions of confinement, including access to contact visits from children). 
10 See, e.g., African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, art. 30, July 11, 
1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/3ae6b38c18.html (“States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to provide 
special treatment to expectant mothers and to mothers of infants and young children . . . and 
shall . . . ensure that a non-custodial sentence will always be first considered when 
sentencing such mothers [and] . . . establish and promote measures alternative to institutional 
confinement for the treatment of such mothers . . . .”). 
11 See generally Tanya Krupat, Invisibility and Children’s Rights: The Consequences of 
Parental Incarceration, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39 (2007) (describing the challenges 
children with incarcerated parents face and arguing for a children’s bill of rights). 
12 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 1; GOLDEN, supra note 5; GABEL & JOHNSTON, supra 
note 1; IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo 
et al. eds., 2004). 
13 See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SERVICES FOR FAMILIES OF PRISON 
INMATES (2002) (surveying the programs and approaches in the various states), available at 
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2002/017272.pdf. 
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surprisingly little written about the relevant legal issues.14  This Article’s 
research and analysis begin to fill the lacuna.  Future research might 
productively draw on legal theory and practice in other related areas: 
parent–child separation in the context of divorce and immigration.15
This Article grapples with a series of key questions: What is the 
relevance, if any, of children of offenders in sentencing, prison locations, 
and conditions of confinement?  To what extent and with what limitations 
or exceptions is there a societal interest in children maintaining a 
relationship with their convicted parents?  If children have a right to be 
considered in sentencing and in visitation policies, what is the legal basis 
for that right?  This Article focuses on minor children and their biological 
parents, legal guardians, or primary caregivers.
 
16  The central goal of this 
Article is to reframe the problem of third party harm to children from 
current sentencing law and prison visitation policy through the lens of 
children’s rights, rather than the traditional frame of prisoners’ rights.  
Drawing on international law and practice, this Article puts forward a 
theory for the relevance of children to the sentencing process and 
development of visitation policy.17
 
14 But see Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral 
Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671 (2003) (discussing 
family separation); Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents 
in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757 
(1992) (analyzing termination of parental rights process in the context of incarceration); 
Ellen Barry et al., Legal Issues for Prisoners with Children, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED 
PARENTS, supra note 
  It suggests that this relevance has a 
sound, if underdeveloped, legal basis grounded in children’s First 
Amendment freedom of association and their due process liberty interests.  
1, at 147 (describing in brief a range of legal challenges facing families 
with incarcerated parents). 
15 Citizen children of immigrant parents find their family rights limited in a range of 
contexts.  See generally Alison M. Osterberg, Removing the Dead Hand on the Future: 
Recognizing Citizen Children’s Rights Against Parental Deportation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 751 (2009) (arguing that the rights of citizen children should be factored into their 
undocumented parents’ removal proceedings); Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in 
the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV 35 (1988) 
(examining sanctions against citizen children for the purposes of discouraging 
undocumented immigration).  There is a complex body of law on child custody in divorce 
proceedings focusing on the best interests of the child and parents’ due process rights.  See 
generally Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 
34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1996) (applying the best interests of the child standard and 
constitutional analysis to custody proceedings). 
16 The argument that follows may be stretched to apply to young adult children, parents 
with children in prison (instead of the other way around), to extended family, or caregivers 
not recognized by law.  However, this Article focuses on legally recognized parent–child 
relationships where the parent plays at least some role in caretaking the child prior to arrest. 
17 The argument does not apply to cases where maintenance of contact is not in the best 
interests of the child. 
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Today, however, minor dependent children are, as a matter of law and 
standard procedure, a non-factor in sentencing and statutory visitation 
guidelines.  Even within the narrow sentencing guidelines in most 
jurisdictions, there is no formal mechanism for family status or dependent 
children to come to the attention of a judge.  When individual prisons or 
jails offer child-friendly visiting facilities, the practice is regarded as a 
privilege, not a right.18
This Article is organized into four parts.  Part II provides an overview 
of the group that is at the heart of this inquiry: children of prisoners.  Part 
III draws on international law and practice to theorize the parent–child 
relationship in the context of the U.S. criminal justice system.  Part IV 
considers the failure of the status quo to adequately factor children into key 
decisions that impact their lives in the context of parental incarceration.  
Specifically, Part IV reviews prison sentencing and visitation policies in 
two jurisdictions—the federal system and New York’s state system
 
19
Finally, Part V puts forward the First Amendment freedom of 
association and the due process liberty interest as the legal bases for 
children’s right to a relationship with their convicted parents.  Part V also 
engages and rebuts possible counter-arguments.  It then concludes by 
describing, in concrete terms, what the practical implications of the 
argument advanced here may be for sentencing, prison visitation, and more. 
—to 
evaluate whether and how dependent children are taken into consideration.  
While sentencing and visitation are only two of the myriad areas in the 
criminal justice process where children’s rights should be recognized, they 
are two of the most important and can serve as proxies for other areas, 
including parole, alternatives to incarceration, furloughs, phone calls, and 
so forth. 
 
18 There are three points that this Article does not argue.  First, the argument here is not 
that children are never taken into account, or that there is no meaningful way for them to 
maintain a relationship with their incarcerated parents.  They certainly are taken into account 
some of the time, and in some jurisdictions they can build meaningful relationships with 
their incarcerated parents, but rarely, if ever, as a matter of right.  Second, this Article does 
not argue that children’s rights should be the framework for approaching criminal justice.  
Of course, other stakeholders, including the state, the offender, and the victim have essential 
voices in the process.  This Article modestly seeks to make room at the table for the children 
who are directly impacted by criminal justice outcomes in which, all too often, their rights 
and interests are ignored.  Finally, this Article does not claim that all children benefit from a 
relationship with their parents all the time but rather focuses on those children whose best 
interests are served through maintaining active contact.  See, e.g., infra note 37. 
19 See infra Part IV for an explanation of why these jurisdictions were chosen. 
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II. THE POPULATION IMPACTED BY PARENTAL INCARCERATION AND THE 
ISSUES AT STAKE 
Of the 74 million children in the United States in mid-2007, 1.7 
million, or 2.3%, had a parent in prison.20  This figure represents an 82% 
increase since 1991 that does not include the growing numbers of children 
with parents incarcerated in jails as opposed to prisons.21  Roughly half of 
these children are under ten years old.22  Due to long prison sentences, more 
than a third of them will reach the age of eighteen while their parents are 
still in prison.  Thus, several hundred thousand more people, now adults, 
experienced parental incarceration as minors,23 and the number would 
surely be far larger if parents in jail were considered as well.  As in the 
prison population, black and Hispanic children are greatly overrepresented 
among those with a parent behind bars: more than 70% are children of 
color.24
 
20 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 
  One out of every forty-three American children had a parent in 
3, at 1–2.  Note that because these Bureau of Justice 
Statistics estimates are based on numbers on a given day—a snapshot—the actual numbers 
of children experiencing parental incarceration at some point in their childhood is much 
larger.  For example, in 2008 alone, 735,454 inmates were released from prison and 739,132 
new inmates entered.  Id. at 3.  One can easily extrapolate the numbers based on the 
percentages of these inmates who are parents and their average number of children.  This 
revolving door in prison population has vast implications for a corresponding number of 
children.  Moreover, this estimate may be significantly understating the problem on at least 
three counts.  First, this number does not include children with a parent in jail or immigration 
detention—at year end 2008 over 785,000 people were held in local jails, and over 30,000 
more in Immigration and Customs enforcement detention centers.  WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 8, 10 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.  Both jail and immigration populations 
have rapid turnover rates so the total number “at year end” is only a fraction of the total 
incarcerated at some point in a given year.  For example, in over a twelve-month period 
between 2008–2009, local jails admitted approximately thirteen million people.  TODD D. 
MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009, at 2 
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf.  In all, the United 
States incarcerates an estimated 2.4 million people on any given day.  See id. at 8.  Second, 
the parental status numbers here are based on self-reporting by inmates, who may be 
disinclined to share personal or family information with surveyors.  See GLAZE & 
MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 11 (explaining methodology and survey practice).  Third, the 
percentage of mothers in prison has elsewhere been estimated to be substantially higher than 
the estimate these numbers are based on.  Thus, other reports have estimated that there are 
closer to 2.4 million children with a parent in jail or prison on any given day.  See, e.g., 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2. 
21 SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf. 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 3. 
24 SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 1. 
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prison; for black children, the number was one out of fifteen, while for 
white children, the figure was one out of one hundred and eleven.25
Switching the focus to the prisoners rather than the children is also 
revealing.  Most of the more than 1.5 million prisoners in the country
 
26 in 
mid-2007 were parents of children under the age of eighteen.27  Put 
differently, 63% of federal inmates and 52% of state inmates reported 
having minor children.28  Because women account for just 7% of inmates, 
or 114,852 prisoners,29 the vast majority of parents in prison are men; in 
2007, the nation’s prisons held 744,200 fathers but only 65,600 mothers.30  
On average, mothers in prison each have approximately 2.4 children while 
fathers each have 2.0 children.31  Prior to their arrest, 64% of incarcerated 
mothers and 46% of incarcerated fathers lived with their minor children.32
When criminal justice policy leads to the incarceration of parents with 
dependent children, what happens to the children left behind?  When the 
father is incarcerated, 88% of the children live with their mother, 12% live 
with grandparents, and 2% are sent to a foster home or agency.
 
33  When the 
mother is incarcerated, 45% live with grandparents, 37% of children live 
with their father, and 11% are sent to foster homes or agencies.34  Where, 
for how long, and with whom children end up living are often determining 
factors in child development.35
 
25 Id. at 2. 
  Yet children’s interests are not, as a matter 
of right, factored into criminal justice determinations involving their 
parents.  The psycho-social challenges faced by children with incarcerated 
26 SABOL ET AL., supra note 20, at 3.  This is by far the highest incarceration rate in the 
world.  ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 
tbl.2 (8th ed. 2003), available at http://kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-
8th_41.pdf. 
27 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 1. 
28 Id. 
29 SABOL ET AL., supra note 20, at 16. 
30 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 2.  This figure indicates that just 57% of 
women in prison are mothers, while earlier studies, also based on Bureau of Justice statistics, 
provided estimates that were closer to 80%.  See Barbara Bloom, Imprisoned Mothers, in 
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS, supra note 1, at 21.  Likewise, New York state 
reports that 74% of its female inmates are mothers.  MICHELE STALEY, N.Y. DEP’T CORR. 
SERV., FEMALE OFFENDERS: 2005–2006, at 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2008/Female_Offenders_2005-2006.pdf. 
31 Denise Johnston, Effects of Parental Incarceration, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED 
PARENTS, supra note 1, at 61. 
32 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 3, at 4.   
33 Id. at 5.  Alternative outcomes include living with other relatives or with friends. 
34 Id. 
35 CYNTHIA BEATTY, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, PARENTS IN PRISON: 
CHILDREN IN CRISIS 11 (1997); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 114 (1996). 
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parents and the pros and cons of prison visitation have been well-studied 
elsewhere.36  The fact that parent–child visitation can help children 
overcome the challenges of parental separation and reduce recidivism rates 
is well-documented.37
III.  THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
  The central inquiry of this Article, however, is less 
well-understood: legal rights of children to a relationship with their parents. 
International law offers a range of approaches to children’s rights that 
may provide a basis for children to claim a relationship with incarcerated 
parents.  The argument here is not concerned with the enforceability of 
international legal standards or foreign law in the United States,38
A. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
 but rather 
with the development of a practicable legal basis for children’s rights to a 
relationship with incarcerated parents.  First, a more general review of the 
theory of the rights of the child is in order. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)39 has been 
universally ratified by every country in the world except Somalia and the 
United States.40  Nonetheless, the United States played a key role in the 
development of the CRC,41
 
36 See supra notes 
 and its approach to children’s rights is a 
12–13; infra notes 50–51. 
37 PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 8 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003); 
William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the Transition to Society: Does 
Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIM & DELINQ. 287, 304 (2008); Jeremy Travis, 
Families and Children, 69 FED. PROBATION 31, 31–32 (2005); see also Solangel Maldonado, 
Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAM. L.Q. 191 (2006) (analyzing the development 
of parenting skills in prison). 
38 See John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees: The Supreme Court and International 
Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579 (2005) (arguing that the Court repeatedly ignores 
international law or takes a highly constricted approach to its application). 
39 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 
1456. 
40 See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 418 n.150 (2009); see also 1 MULTILATERAL 
TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL 389, 391 (2009), United Nations Treaty 
Collection, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last modified Nov. 4, 2010).  Somalia has 
reportedly taken steps towards ratification.  Press Release, UNICEF, UNICEF Welcomes 
Decision by the Somali Transitional Federal Government to Ratify the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Nov. 20 2009), available at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ 
media_51841.html.  
41 Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Creating a New World for Children, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 9, 25–26 
(1998). 
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valuable point of reference in theorizing children’s rights in the United 
States.  The CRC does not specifically contemplate children with 
incarcerated parents, except to guarantee them the right to information 
about their parents’ whereabouts.42
A criminal conviction of a parent or parents should in no way diminish 
or undermine the rights of the child.  The CRC requires that parties ensure 
children’s rights are protected “irrespective of the child’s or his or her 
parent’s or legal guardians’ . . . status.”
  Nonetheless, its provisions create a 
strong legal basis for a child-oriented approach to sentencing and visitation 
policy. 
43  The CRC goes on to recognize 
the child’s right to “know and be cared for by his or her parents.”44
Children must have a voice, either by themselves or through 
representation,
  This 
language need not be incompatible with parental incarceration, and can 
easily be read as having implications for when incarceration is appropriate 
and the kinds of visitation that should be available.  This CRC language 
creates potential for tension between the child’s right to “know and be cared 
for by his or her parents” and whatever societal interests may be served by 
incarceration. 
45 in proceedings that directly affect their well-being.  The 
CRC mandates that children be given a voice in all issues of import to their 
lives, including “the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child.”46
Children also have a right to contact with their incarcerated parents.  
Article 9 of the CRC requires that parties “respect the right of the child who 
is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and 
direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to 
the child’s best interests.”
  Sentencing a parent to 
prison invariably has a profound and immediate impact on the child 
including the possibility for multiple changes in caregivers and addresses, 
the loss of parental support, and even termination of parental rights.  
Providing children with a voice in parental criminal justice proceedings 
would therefore be consistent with the CRC. 
47  This suggests that separation due to parental 
incarceration48
 
42 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
 cannot include conditions or circumstances that preclude 
39, at art. 9(4). 
43 Id. at art. 2(2). 
44 Id. at art. 7(1). 
45 Such representation could be provided by a guardian ad litem or a court-appointed 
attorney. 
46 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39, at art. 12. 
47 Id. at art. 9(3). 
48 Myriad other causes beyond the scope of this Article including juvenile detention may 
also raise the same concerns. 
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regular contact, except where such contact is not in the child’s best 
interests.49
Whether visitation is beneficial for children or for incarcerated parents 
is highly dependent on the specific dynamics in each family and the 
conditions of each visiting facility.  The costs and benefits of facilitating 
visitation are more a question of policy and social science than of law.  
However, it is safe to assume
 
50 that accessible, child-friendly visiting 
facilities can yield significant benefits for both children and their 
incarcerated parents.51
The “best interests of the child” standard is common to both 
international law and United States domestic law.
  Thus, policies and practices that indiscriminately 
make contact visitation difficult or impossible for the majority of children 
with incarcerated parents are in direct tension with the approach to 
children’s rights that led to Article 9 in the CRC and its recognition of a 
child’s right “to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both 
parents on a regular basis” when in the “child’s best interests.” 
52
 
49 The issue of whether or not visitation is in the best interests of children with 
incarcerated parents is beyond the scope of this Article.  Here, it is enough to assume that 
contact visitation is in the best interests of at least some children.  It is those children and 
their rights that are the central concern of the argument here.  See also infra notes 
  Article 9 of the CRC 
relies on the “best interests of the child” standard for determining when and 
what contact may be appropriate.  Article 3 of the CRC states that “in all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”  The 
“best interests” standard has been a guiding principle in U.S. law for over 
50–51. 
50 See generally Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental 
Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME & JUST. 133 (2008) (reviewing literature and citing 
studies); Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie That Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 
1408 (1978) (arguing that facilitating parent–child bonds in the context of incarceration is in 
the interests of the children). 
51 Denise Johnston, Parent–Child Visitation in the Jail or Prison, in CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS, supra note 1, at 135; Seymour & Hairston, eds, supra note 5, at 13.  
Note also that visitation with children and family members is strongly correlated with 
reduced recidivism rates for inmates; however, that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  
The focus here is on the children, not the inmates.  See Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, 
Transitions from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways, 29 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 89, 100 (2003); see also STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 1, 13 (2009) (suggesting that visitation 
may be a crucial part of breaking intergenerational cycles of incarceration), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/COC/PDFs/fatherhood/NCSL_ChildrenOfIncarceratedParents_0309.
pdf.  See generally sources cited supra, note 37. 
52 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 84 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “myriad other state statutes and court decisions at least nominally” apply the best 
interest of the child standard). 
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125 years53 and is “universally recognized across the [United States] as the 
core concept of laws relating to children.”54  All fifty states and the federal 
government have laws that use the “best interests” standard in statutes 
concerning adoption, parental rights, education, child labor, and other areas 
of child welfare.  References to the “best interests” standard frequently 
appear in state and federal court decisions.55
B. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE 
CHILD 
  This common standard 
however is vague on its face and is subject to wide-ranging interpretations 
and applications across jurisdictions. 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“the 
Charter”) echoes the language of the CRC in establishing the “best 
interests” standard56 and specifically addresses children with incarcerated 
mothers.  The Charter requires parties “to provide special treatment to 
expectant mothers and to mothers of infants and young children” when 
convicted of criminal offenses and to “ensure that a non-custodial sentence 
will always be first considered when sentencing such mothers.”57  The same 
Article requires that parties “establish and promote measures alternative to 
institutional confinement for the treatment of such mothers,” and prohibits 
the death penalty for mothers.58
 
53 M.R. GARDNER & A.P. DUPRE, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
  The focus on mothers appears to reflect the 
assumption in much of the world that the practice of incarcerating mothers 
is generally more disruptive to children’s lives than the practice of 
incarcerating fathers.  However, while there are some valid, biologically 
determined gender distinctions, such as with pregnant or lactating mothers, 
incarcerating fathers may also have significant repercussions for dependent 
54 Elisabeth A. Mason, The Best Interests of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. 
RATIFICATION 121 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik & Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006). 
55 GARDNER & DUPRE, supra note 53, at 62. 
56 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Nov. 29, 1999, 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38c18.html.  
Article 4 reads:  
Best Interests of the Child, 1. In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or 
authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.  2. In all judicial or 
administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his/her own 
views, an opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either directly or 
through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken 
into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law. 
57 Id. art. 30.  It is troubling that the Charter exhibits this gender bias, although not 
entirely surprising given the international reality of child-rearing falling largely on mothers. 
58 Id. 
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children.  By limiting its protection to mothers, this Article excludes the 
majority of prisoners and children with parents in prison.  This limitation 
notwithstanding, the Charter provides one of the clearest recognitions of the 
rights and interests of children with incarcerated parents in international 
law.59
The CRC and the Charter are more than just idealistic, aspirational 
documents; their language protecting children with incarcerated parents has 
been incorporated into national jurisprudence in South Africa.  In the 
landmark Constitutional Court case, S v. M, the central question was: What 
are the duties of a sentencing court when sentencing a primary caregiver of 
minor children, bearing in mind the constitutional protection of the best 
interests of the child?
 
60  Justice Sachs, writing for the Court, relied heavily 
not only on Section 28(2) of the South African Constitution61 but also cited 
the CRC62 and the Charter.63  Justice Sachs considered the “best interests of 
the child” standard, concluding that when it comes to sentencing, “[t]o 
apply a pre-determined formula for the sake of certainty, irrespective of the 
circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of the child 
concerned.”64  In exploring the reach of these provisions in sentencing 
proceedings, Justice Sachs held that the “objective is to ensure that the 
sentencing court is in a position adequately to balance all the varied 
interests involved including those of the children.”65  The opinion clearly 
states that the purpose “is not to permit errant parents unreasonably to avoid 
appropriate punishment.  Rather, it is to protect the innocent children.”66
 
59 Cf. Resolution on a European Charter of Rights of the Child 1992, at art. 8.15, 
reprinted in GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON CHILDREN 53 (2d ed. 
1998) (“Any child who has one or both parents in prison must be allowed to maintain contact 
with them.  Young children living with their mothers in prisons must have the benefit of 
suitable facilities and care.  The Member State shall guarantee that such children attend 
school outside the prison.”).   
  
Ultimately, Justice Sachs established a multipart test for sentencing parents 
that clearly, but not necessarily decisively, incorporates children’s rights.  
This Constitutional Court decision is a valuable example of how the 
60 S v. M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
61 “A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.”  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 28(2). 
62 S v. M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) at 245 para. 16. 
63 Id. at 250 para. 31. 
64 Id. at 248 para. 24. 
65 Id. at 251 para. 33. 
66 Id. at 252 para. 35.  Justice Sachs went on to explain that a parent who would 
otherwise necessarily be sentenced to prison will still have to be incarcerated.  Id. at 252 
para. 39. 
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children’s right to family integrity is cognizable in the context of parental 
incarceration.67
C. EUROPEAN LAW 
 
European law and policy also recognize, though less explicitly than the 
CRC or the Charter, the rights of children with incarcerated parents.68  The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union establishes that 
“[e]very child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is 
contrary to his or her interests.”69  The standard was further articulated in 
2006 when the Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, promulgated 
model European Prison Rules (“the Rules”).70  Article 24.4 of the Rules 
recommends that “arrangements for visits shall be such as to allow 
prisoners to maintain and develop family relationships in as normal a 
manner as possible.”  Specifically, inmates are “allowed to communicate as 
often as possible by letter, telephone or other forms of communication with 
their families . . . and to receive visits.”71  The Rules also indicate that 
“[p]risoners shall be allocated, as far as possible, to prisons close to their 
homes.”72
European law enshrines children’s right to a family.  Article 8 of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms establishes a right to respect for private and family 
life, including “no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right.”
  While these rules and recommendations are framed in terms of 
the prisoners’ rights, there are direct and reciprocal implications for the 
rights of prisoners’ children. 
73  The right, however, is subject to exceptions for national 
security, public safety, crime prevention, and more.  The language of the 
Article appears verbatim in national legislation as well, such as England’s 
Human Rights Act of 1998.74
 
67 Id. at 252 para. 36. 
  The language of Article 8 suggests that any 
68 See generally D. KING, DUBLIN INST. OF TECHNOLOGY, PARENTS, CHILDREN AND 
PRISONS: EFFECTS OF PARENTAL IMPRISONMENT ON CHILDREN (2002) (reviewing literature, 
international law, and international models of best practice), available at 
http://arrow.dit.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=cserrep. 
69 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 24, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) 13. 
70 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation on European Prison 
Rules (Jan. 11, 2006), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747. 
71 Id. at art. 24.1. 
72 Id. at art. 17.1. 
73 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
74 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
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interference—presumably including incarceration in general, and lengthy 
sentences or restrictive visiting conditions in particular—must serve a 
legitimate purpose and be proportionate to that aim.  Disproportionate 
restrictions on visiting or overly harsh sentences would prima facie be 
unjustified.  While extremely limited by and balanced against other societal 
interests, this recognition of children’s rights goes considerably further than 
the status quo approach in the United States.75
Courts interpreting Article 8 not only are deferential to prison 
authorities, but also factor in the interests and rights of the child.  For 
example, in R v. Secretary of State the Supreme Court of Judicature Court 
of Appeal Civil Division in England considered the validity of forced 
separation of infant children from their incarcerated mothers.  The court 
recognized that in the context of parental incarceration “[c]ompulsory 
separation is, on the face of it, a serious interference by the state in the 
children’s right to respect for that family life.”
  However, the exceptions 
written into the Article may be determinative for most children: 
imprisonment is clearly a gross interference with family life, though it is 
virtually self-justifying under the crime and public safety exceptions. 
76  Like Justice Sachs in 
South Africa, the court in England emphasized the need for balancing: 
“[t]he more serious the intervention in any given case (and interventions 
cannot come very much more serious than the act of separating a mother 
from a very young child), the more compelling must be the justification.”77  
Wherever possible courts must “ensure that the mother can be punished 
adequately for her offence without the necessity of taking her into custody 
away from her children.”78
Were this an ordinary dispute about the enforced separation of parent and child by the 
state, [the children] would have been separately represented by an expert guardian ad 
litem and their own lawyers.  We cannot know whether or not those representatives 
would have supported these applications, but we cannot avoid giving separate 
consideration to the position of the children.
  Although R v. Secretary of State was brought 
by incarcerated mothers, the court found it necessary to consider the 
interests of the children as well: 
79
The European Court of Human Rights has often recognized “that the 
mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a 




75 See infra Parts III & IV. 
  Yet, despite 
all that may be at stake and children’s legal right to noninterference in 
76 R v. Secretary of State [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1151, [83] (Eng.). 
77 Id. at [78]; see also id. at [65] for details of the balancing test. 
78 Id. at [79]. 
79 Id. at [82]. 
80 Id. at [83] (citing cases). 
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family life, children facing parental separation due to incarceration are not 
appointed guardians ad litem or their own lawyers.  Thus, there is an 
explicit, but underdeveloped, judicial recognition of children’s rights and 
family interests as a factor in the criminal justice processing of their 
parents. 
D. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Around the world, there are countries that have recognized children’s 
rights in the context of parental incarceration.  The Supreme Court of South 
Australia found that the welfare of young, dependent children justified 
conditional release of one of a married couple convicted of social security 
fraud.81  New Zealand’s Sentencing Act of 2002 requires that judges “take 
into account the offender’s personal, family . . . background in imposing a 
sentence or other means of dealing with the offender with a partly or wholly 
rehabilitative purpose.”82  In Italy, criminal law provides for house arrest 
for pregnant women or women with very young children.83  In Fiji, courts 
have expressly considered the best interests of the child in bail hearings for 
parents.84  A U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Rights of the Child 
provides that when sentencing or deciding on pretrial measures for a child’s 
sole or primary caregiver member states should prioritize non-custodial 
measures while considering both the gravity of the offense and the need to 
protect the public and the child.85
 
81 Walsh v. Dep’t of Soc. Sec. [1996] 67 SASR 143 (Austl.). 
  Thus, there is a wide range of examples 
of international and foreign jurisdictions factoring the interests of the child 
into the criminal justice processing of parents and suggesting possibilities 
for change within the United States.  Before analyzing U.S. constitutional 
law, with this international and foreign law in mind, an overview of the 
status quo for U.S. sentencing and visitation standards is in order. 
82 Sentencing Act 2002 (N.Z.). 
83 Finocchiaro Act, Act No. 40/01, Alternative Measures to detention with the aim of 
protecting the relationship between mother detainees and their children.  Article 146 of the 
penal code provides that “the execution of the detention penalty can be postponed inter alia 
in relation to mothers of children under the age of one.”  Article 4 of Act No. 165/98 
extended the house detention measure to mother detainees of children under the age of ten. 
See JEAN TOMKIN, ORPHANS OF JUSTICE, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE 28 n.114 (2009), 
available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/humanrights/women-in-prison/Orphans-of-
Justice200908-English.pdf. 
84 Yuen Yei Ha v. The State, [2004] FJHC 228, available at 
http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2004/228.html; Devi v The State [2003] FJHC 47, 
available at http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2003/47.html.  
85 G.A. Res 63/241, ¶47(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/241 (Mar. 13, 2009). 
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IV. SENTENCING AND VISITING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE CHILD? 
There are two key areas where the rights and interests of children 
might come into play during parental incarceration.  The first is in the 
context of a specific, one-off moment of judicially determined sentencing.86
Rather than attempting a fifty state survey, the following discussion 
focuses on the federal and New York systems so as to benefit from in-depth 
comparative analysis.  The federal system is an obvious point of reference 
because of its size
  
The second is in the broader, temporally expansive, and more complex 
context of visitation.  This Part considers current law and practice in both 
sentencing law and visitation policy, with comparative analysis of the 
federal and New York state systems in order to illuminate the problem at 
the heart of this inquiry: the denial of children’s rights to a relationship with 
their incarcerated parents. 
87 and national reach across all of the United States.  New 
York is an especially useful state to analyze because it is one of just six 
states in the country that have specific statutory or administrative law 
language regarding families of inmates,88 and it is the leader of some twenty 
states that have begun to reduce their prison populations.89  Additionally, 
though New York, like almost all other states,90
 
86 This Part of the Article serves as a preliminary response to Judge Nancy Gertner, of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, who insisted that “the impact on 
families of the imprisonment of the defendant . . . needs to be carefully reexamined by all the 
participants in the federal sentencing system.”  Nancy Gertner, Women, Justice, and 
Authority: How Justice Affects Women: Women Offenders and the Sentencing Guidelines, 14 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 300 (2002). 
 does not provide any 
87 The federal prison system holds over 200,000 inmates, more than any single state.  
SABOL ET AL., supra note 20, at 17. 
88 Jade S. Laughlin et al., Incarcerated Mothers and Child Visitation: A Law, Social 
Science, and Policy Perspective, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 215, 226 (2008).  This figure is 
based on a 2002 fifty state survey.  The other five states included: Alaska, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, and Massachusetts. 
89 From 2007 to 2008, New York’s prison population decreased by 3.6%, more than any 
of the other state’s reporting a decline in the number of inmates.  SABOL ET AL., supra note 
20, at 2, 17. 
90 Laughlin, supra note 88, at 226. 
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specific legal right for children to visit, it is one of the national leaders in 
family visitation opportunities and services.91
A. SENTENCING PROCEDURES FAIL TO RECOGNIZE CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 
 
New York’s sentencing guidelines provide precisely defined 
sentencing ranges that limit judicial discretion.92  While judges still do have 
some discretion, the law stipulates precise ranges for each category of 
offense.93  Once a prosecutor brings a particular charge and the jury 
convicts, the sentencing judge is confined to a statutory range of sentencing 
options.  The limits on judicial discretion in sentencing present a range of 
issues that have been well documented elsewhere.94
 
91 Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, for example, has long been recognized as a 
leading example of child-focused programming.  MERRY MORASH ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE WOMEN OFFENDERS, PROGRAMMING NEEDS AND PROMISING APPROACHES 8 (1998); 
Katherine Gabel & Kathryn Girard, Long-Term Care Nurseries in Prisons: A Descriptive 
Study, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS, supra note 
  Of particular interest 
1, at 238–40; Noelle E. Fearn & 
Kelly Parker, Washington State’s Residential Parenting Program: An Integrated Public 
Health, Education, and Social Service Resource for Pregnant Inmates and Prison Mothers, 2 
CAL. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 34, 39 (2004); Denise Johnston, Intervention, in CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS, supra note 1, at 207; Mark S. Kaplan & Jennifer E. Sasser, Women 
Behind Bars: Trends and Policy Issues, 23 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 43, 51 (1996); Nicole S. 
Mauskopf, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison Nurseries, 5 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 101, 101 (1998).  New York is one of just six states to offer at least some of 
its prisoners extended “family reunion” overnight visits.  Kacy E. Wiggum, Defining Family 
in American Prisons, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 357, 357 (2009). 
92 N.Y. PENAL LAW at §§ 70.00–70.08 (McKinney 2009). 
93 Id.  Indeed sentencing reforms and guidelines across the country were implemented in 
order to curb judicial discretion.  Pauline K. Brennan & Cassia Spohn, Empirical Research 
on the Impact of Sentencing Reforms: Recent Studies of State and Federal Sentencing 
Innovations, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 340, 340 (2008); see also SAMUEL WALKER, 
TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990 (1993) 
(describing the history of efforts to curb discretion in sentencing); Sandra Shane-Dubow, 
Introduction to Models of Sentencing Reform in the United States, 20 LAW & POL’Y 231 
(1998) (explaining the trend away from judicial discretion in sentencing). 
94 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 
88 B.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (questioning the focus on prior bad acts at sentencing); Paul J. 
Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the 
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003) 
(considering when departure from federal sentencing guidelines may be appropriate); Ian 
Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory 
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
87 (2003) (examining the ways in which mandatory minimum sentences undermine just 
sentencing); Shimica Gaskins, Note, “Women of Circumstance”—The Effects of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1533 (2004) (discussing mandatory minimums specifically in the context of federal 
sentencing and female drug offenders). 
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here is that circumscribed judicial discretion in sentencing means that even 
when judges would otherwise be inclined to investigate and factor in a 
convict’s family obligations, it is difficult to do so.  Children of the 
convicted are essentially considered irrelevant third parties to sentencing.   
However, other third parties are directly included in the process: 
victims.95  Of course the sentencing guidelines limit a judge’s ability to 
consider victims of offenses too—a judge can consider victims or children 
of a convicted person, but only within the sentencing guideline range.  
Nevertheless, state law requires that the prosecutor consult with and obtain 
the views of the victim or the victim’s family in an array of circumstances 
throughout the criminal justice process,96 thus giving the victims a say in 
what charges are brought and ultimately what sentencing range in the 
guidelines a judge will have to apply.  Moreover, the sentencing guidelines 
themselves were developed with explicit deference to victims’ rights.  An 
executive order97
ensure that appropriate consideration be given to the impact of New York’s 
sentencing laws on crime victims, their families and the community.  It is indisputable 
that with the possible exception of the defendant, no one has a more direct stake in the 
just outcome of a criminal case—and the propriety of any sentence imposed—than the 
crime victim.
 directs the New York State Commission on Sentencing 
Reform to: 
98
Thus, victims and their families are rightly recognized as having a stake in 
the process, but children of offenders are unfairly ignored.
 
99
Virtually the only procedure that could possibly alert a judge to the 
family circumstances of an offender would be the presentence report.
   
100
 
95 While victims might not be considered third parties, technically they are not party to 
criminal proceedings.  Moreover, the term “victim” is generally construed broadly enough to 
encompass the family members of murder victims who, like children of criminals, are 
certainly third parties who are directly impacted.  One could argue that both families of 
victims and families of offenders are directly impacted and therefore not actually “third 
parties,” however, for the purposes of this Article, the term simply refers to anyone not party 
in the criminal proceedings. 
  
Specifically, the presentence investigation “consists of the gathering of 
96 N.Y. Exec Law §§ 642, 647 (McKinney 2005). 
97 29 N.Y. Reg. 103–04 (Mar. 28, 2007). 
98 Id. at 104; see also N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON SENTENCING REFORM, THE FUTURE OF 
SENTENCING IN NEW YORK STATE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 170 (2009), available at 
http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/csr_report2-2009.pdf (“New York has established 
a solid statutory foundation in the area of victim rights, a foundation that recognizes the 
critical role played by victims in the criminal justice process and, in particular, sentencing-
related matters.”). 
99 Note that other third parties are not similarly included: victims are uniquely invited to 
participate in proceedings. 
100 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 390.20–390.50 (McKinney 2009).  
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information with respect to the circumstances attending the commission of 
the offense, the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, and the 
defendant’s social history, employment history, family situation, economic 
status, education, and personal habits.”101  This provision provides the only 
textual opening for inclusion of minor dependent children in a 
presentencing report.  The phrase “family situation” is buried in a laundry 
list of other potentially relevant circumstances, is not invested with any 
noticeable grammatical or linguistic significance, and does not even 
specifically mention children.  In contrast, the same provision of the code 
has an entire subsection dedicated to the inclusion of a victim impact 
statement in the report.  Victim impact statements are, as a general rule, to 
be included in all reports.102
As in New York State, federal judges’ discretion has been defined and 
circumscribed by legislation and guidelines.  In 2005, however, when the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Booker,
 
103
Congress mandates that federal judges weigh a number of factors at 
sentencing.
 the 
rules of federal sentencing dramatically changed.  Although in the post-
Booker world federal judges have substantially increased discretion, there is 
still no legal recognition of children’s rights in sentencing. 
104  Specifically, judges are to consider: “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant;”105 the seriousness of the offense, deterrence of future criminal 
conduct, and public safety;106 and “the kinds of sentences available.”107  
The statute also refers judges to the Guidelines developed by the United 
States Sentencing Commission (USSC).108
The Guidelines include a sentencing table that was designed to be so 
detailed that, once a judge identified the category of criminal history and 
 
 
101 Id. at § 390.30(1). 
102 Id. at § 390.30(3)(b).  Here, I am not arguing that victim impact statements should be 
excluded.  That issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  Rather, the explicit inclusion of 
victims in the report is noteworthy because it provides a concrete example of the ways in 
which third parties—persons other than the state and the convicted person—are brought to 
the sentencing judges’ attention. 
103 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that sentencing courts 
must consider sentencing guidelines, but the guidelines are not mandatory). 
104 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003). 
105 Id. at § 3553(a)(1). 
106 Id. at § 3553(a)(2). 
107 Id. at § 3553(a)(3). 
108 Id. at § 3553(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(5)(A), (b)(1). 
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the offense level, there would be extremely limited discretion.109  The 
statute limited the authority of sentencing judges to impose a sentence 
below a statutory minimum to circumstances in which mitigating 
circumstances were “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
Guidelines.”110  However, in establishing categories for the Guidelines the 
USSC was supposed to take matters including “family ties and 
responsibilities” into consideration, “to the extent that they do have 
relevance.”111  The USSC took children of offenders into consideration—it 
instructs that “family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a departure may be warranted.”112  Accordingly, even 
if a judge was aware of and sympathetic to minor dependent children of a 
convicted person facing sentencing, under the Guidelines she may have 
been unable to alter the sentence accordingly.  Judges seeking to depart 
downward because of family circumstances risked reversal on appeal.113
Even as the children and families of offenders were largely excluded 
from consideration in the sentencing process, another third party group was 
included.  In a statutory provision titled “Crime Victims’ Rights,” Congress 




109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2009guid/GL2009.pdf. [hereinafter USSC MANUAL].  The range 
between the minimum and the maximum sentence within a given box on the table ranges 
from as little as six months up to five years for sentences upwards of thirty years.  Id.  Note 
that before the Guidelines were in effect, federal courts had much greater latitude in 
determining sentences.  Bruce M. Selya and Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging 
Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1, 1 (1991).  While some lower courts found the Sentencing Reform Act 
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, the Supreme Court upheld its validity in 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
  These rights include 
110 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006). 
111 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006), as amended by Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. 111-273, 124 Stat 2858. 
112 USSC MANUAL, supra note 109, at §5H1.6; see United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 
1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that departures on the basis of family ties and responsibilities 
should be rare since the USSC considered family circumstances in formulating the 
guidelines), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1018 (1996).  Nonetheless, “[t]here is absolutely no 
indication that the Commission ever considered pregnancy and single parenting, let alone the 
lopsided gender effect that imprisoning single mothers has on their children.”  Myrna S. 
Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based 
Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 
905, 949 (1993).  In light of this oversight, Judge Gertner has suggested that downward 
“departures should be considered on the general grounds under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), a 
mitigating circumstance not adequately considered by the Commission.”  Gertner, supra 
note 86, at 300 n.48. 
113 See infra note 119. 
114 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006). 
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notice of developments involving the offender and being “heard at any 
public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or 
any parole proceeding.”115  In addition, the statute gives the victim the 
“right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.”116  The 
point here is not to suggest that these rights are wrongly accorded to victims 
but simply to highlight the fact that federal law, like New York state law, 
explicitly brings third parties into the criminal justice process.  Victims are 
guaranteed a voice and consideration in ways that could easily impact the 
specific charges brought and the sentence handed down.  Yet when it comes 
to children of offenders, “family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily 
relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.”117
Until 2005, judges generally did not have the authority to depart from 
the Guidelines because of children or family circumstances except in 
“extraordinary” circumstances, a standard that has been subject to grossly 
inconsistent interpretation.
  Thus 
the USSC makes clear that minor dependent children, present in the lives of 




115 Id. at § 3771(a)(2), (a)(4). 
  Judges who departed from the Guidelines 
116 Id. at § 3771(a)(5). 
117 USSC MANUAL, supra note 109, §5H1.6; see United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 
1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that departures on the basis of family ties and responsibilities 
should be rare since the USSC considered family circumstances in formulating the 
Guidelines), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1018 (1996). 
118 See United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[S]tatus as a single 
mother of three, (now four), young children simply is not, as [defendant] contends, an 
unusual family circumstance.”); United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held that, unless there are unique or 
extraordinary circumstances, a downward departure from the Guidelines, based on the 
defendant’s parental responsibilities, is improper.”).  But see United States v. Galante, 111 
F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir. 1997) (comparing defendant’s circumstances to those in Alba); 
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding extraordinary family 
circumstances justifying downward departure where defendant lived with and supported his 
wife, two daughters, disabled father, and grandmother).  These cases are exceptional and 
judges tended to enforce the Guidelines in their sentencing procedures.  However, when 
surveyed, numerous judges expressed discontent with the Guidelines’ failure to give weight 
to family ties and responsibilities.  LINDA D. MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT: SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES ES-6 
(2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf. 
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were often overruled on appeal119—the law sent a clear message to 
sentencing judges and defense lawyers alike: dependent minor children do 
not matter.  Then, in 2005, United States v. Booker significantly changed 
criminal sentencing procedures.120  The Court held that the Federal 
Sentencing Act provisions that made the Guidelines mandatory121 and set 
forth a standard of review on appeal122 were inconsistent with the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial requirements and thus invalid.123  The Court further 
held that the proper standard of review on appeal was unreasonableness.124
 
119 See generally United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 759 (4th Cir. 1996) (overruling a 
downward departure based, in part, on convict’s nine-year-old son with neurological 
problems and mentally ill wife); United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 237 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(finding downward departure inappropriate in case of mother with fourteen-month-old 
infant); United States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 961 (5th Cir. 1994) (overruling a downward 
departure based on convict’s two children under the age of five who were being placed with 
their impoverished great-grandmother); United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 
1993) (finding convict’s two minor children who “would be placed at potential risk” 
insufficient grounds for downward departure); United States v. Harrison, 970 F.2d 444, 448 
(8th Cir. 1992) (applying Guidelines to sentencing of a single mother of a child who, in 
defendant’s absence, would be cared for by an alleged alcohol and drug abuser); United 
States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992) (supporting two minor children and a 
dependent mother was not so unusual as to justify downward departure); United States v. 
Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the possibility of downward departure 
for a single mother with three mentally disabled children and one grandchild); United States 
v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding a denial of a request for 
downward departure in the case of a single mother with five young children); United States 
v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s 
society, and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the 
children.”).  But see United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 972, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(allowing downward departure where defendant had developed a “critical and unique” 
relationship with his partner’s twelve-year-old son); United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 
129–31 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify downward 
departure where defendant mother was the sole support for an infant, two other young 
children, and one grandchild). 
  
The result of the decision was that the Guidelines went from being 
mandatory to advisory.  Post-Booker sentencing judges are allowed to tailor 
a sentence in light of a range of statutory concerns as long as they consider 
120 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The case made such a splash that in 
the less than five years since it was published, its name has appeared in the title of 135 
separate law review or journal articles, notes, and comments.  This figure was obtained in the 
LEXIS “US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database with a search protocol 
“TITLE(booker) and date(geq (01/01/2005) and leq(11/19/2010).” 
121 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2002). 
122 Id. at § 3742(e). 
123 Booker, 543 U.S. at 250. 
124 Id. at 261. 
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the Guidelines.125  Booker has largely liberated federal judges from the rigid 
Guidelines so that they can exercise discretion.126
Yet in cases that cited Booker, family ties and responsibilities account 
for just 2.2% of the sentences below the Guideline range.
   
127  Even that 
diminutive percentage of departures is probably concentrated in a relatively 
small number of judges.128  Judge Gertner explains that she “now feel[s] 
that [she] ha[s] considerable discretion under United States v. Booker.”129  
Even before Booker, she “was a critic of the ‘extraordinary family 
circumstances’ guidelines.”130  Post-Booker, she frequently departs from the 
Guidelines and can do so with confidence that she will not be appealed or 
reversed.131  However, as her decisions indicate even pre-Booker,132
B. VISITATION POLICIES AND CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED 
PARENTS 
 she is 
clearly exceptional in her willingness to consider family circumstances at 
sentencing.  If judges are not required to consider children with a clear 
interest in an ongoing relationship with their parents, and if children do not 
have an explicit legal right to be factored into the process, then some judges 
will ignore them.  Once parents are sentenced to prison, visitation policies 
determine the quantity and quality of parent–child interaction. 
Most prisons make some provision for visitation.133
 
125 “If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions 
that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to 
differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 233. 
  There is, 
however, tremendous variation in prison visiting conditions between 
126 In fact, a subsequent Supreme Court decision held that appeals courts may not 
presume that a sentence outside the Guideline range is unreasonable on that basis alone.  
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines 
range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness.”). 
127 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 82 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf. 
128 Myrna Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines World, 
37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 716 (2006). 
129 E-mail from Nancy Gertner, Judge, United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, to the author (Mar. 21, 2010, 9:48 EST) (on file with the author). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 n.17 (D. Mass. 
2004); United States v. Thompson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D. Mass. 2002); United States 
v. LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D. Mass. 2002). 
133 DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF FAMILY TIES 17 (2009). 
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jurisdictions and even within them.134  While some individual prisons are 
exemplary in their efforts to foster child-friendly visiting conditions and 
programming, children and their parents have little if any legal basis for 
demanding particular visiting conditions or access.  Some prisons offer 
special visiting opportunities for families of inmates, but even then they 
tend to “narrowly define the family members who are granted visiting 
privileges.”135  Children are not always favored when it comes to visiting 
policies, and in some cases they are targeted for exclusion.136
New York state has a uniform, standard policy for its Inmate Visitor 
Program (Visitor Program), which encourages visitation in maximum 
security prisons.
  This subpart 
first reviews New York state’s administrative law governing prison 
visitation with attention to some of the disparities in implementation and 
then examines the state’s family reunion program and the visiting program 
at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility (Bedford Hills) as models of child-
friendly approaches.  The second part focuses on the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, in which geography and policy conspire to make visitation an 
intimidating proposition for many children. 
137  The Visitor Program does not cater to or make special 
dispensation for children of inmates but does refer to issues of family 
visitation.138  Consistent with the Visitor Program directives, each prison 
can develop unique visiting conditions and practices that result in 
substantial variation within the state.139
 
134 For example, New York’s maximum security prisons have all day visiting hours 
every day of the year while medium security prisons only allow weekend and holiday visits.  
N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., DIRECTIVE NO. 4403, INMATE VISITOR PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 10, 
1993), available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Directives/4403.pdf. 
  In addition, New York is one of 
135 Travis, supra note 37, at 37. 
136 See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (finding a legitimate penological 
interest in excluding certain children from visitation facilities). 
137 N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Directive No. 4403, supra note 134; see also 7 N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 200.2(a)(4), (b)(2) (2010) (encouraging visits with immediate 
family members).  Note that this New York state statute provides for contact visits while 
many states do not allow them. § 200.2(b)(2). 
138 Only six states have statutes or administrative law guidelines regarding families of 
inmates.  Laughlin, supra note 88, at 226. 
139 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., HANDBOOK FOR THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF NEW 
YORK STATE DOCS INMATES 9 (2007) (“Depending on the correctional facility, activities for 
children vary.  Most facilities have a specialized area where children can watch videos and 
play games.  Normally, you can not take toys or stuffed animals into the visiting room.”), 
available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/FamilyGuide/FamilyHandbook.pdf.  Some 
variation between prisons is inevitable, especially when dealing with a wide range of 
offenders and security classifications.  In New York state, the maximum security prisons 
have significantly improved access to and quality of visitation as compared to lower security 
classifications.  The real question is, what should be the minimum standard required? 
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just six states in the country to offer some of its inmates a “family reunion 
program” for extended overnight visitation.140
Children are mentioned in New York’s prison visiting regulations but 
with few special visiting privileges.  The Visitor Program provides for 
groups of children to enter a prison with an approved adult for special 
programs like that at Bedford Hills.
 
141  While the Visitor Program 
contemplates the need for special visiting conditions for professional 
meetings with attorneys and clergy, no similar consideration is made for 
children.142  Children are only referenced for narrow, bureaucratic, and 
security-related reasons, and no specific provisions are made for child-
friendly visiting conditions, unless at the discretion of an individual 
superintendent.  Children are considered as an inevitable part of the Visiting 
Program, but nowhere does the state recognize anything close to a right to 
visitation with incarcerated parents, nor establish a standard for child-
friendly facilities.143
In some of its prisons, New York offers a child-friendly visiting 
program called the Family Reunion Program.
 
144  The stated goal of the 
program is to “preserve, enhance, and strengthen family ties that have been 
disrupted as a result of incarceration.”145  Of course, the state may have its 
own unstated, but equally valid, reasons for permitting the program that 
have nothing to do with the interests or rights of the children.146  Whatever 
the goals, it allows minor children of inmates to spend up to two full days 
inside the prison in specially-equipped housing units.147
 
140 See supra note 
  A wide range of 
law and policy implications of this program have been studied elsewhere—
91. 
141 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., DIRECTIVE NO. 4403, supra note 134, at 3. 
142 Id. at 2.  
143 This is the norm—nationwide, only two states (California and Florida) have statutory 
language that promotes parent–child visitation, and just four others (Alaska, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New York) have administrative law guidelines that specifically 
contemplate children of inmates.  Laughlin, supra note 88, at 226.  New York does 
statutorily require visitation support for those children who are in state custody. N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW § 619 (McKinney 2003). 
144 N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Directive No. 4500, Family Reunion Program, Jan 28, 
2009, available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Directives/4500.pdf. 
145 Id. at 1. 
146 For example, as early as 1980 the New York Department of Correctional Services 
published findings suggesting that the program decreased recidivism rates as much as sixty-
seven percent.  D. G. MACDONALD & D. KELLY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP 
SURVEY OF POST-RELEASE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR OF PARTICIPANTS IN FAMILY REUNION 
PROGRAM 1 (1980).  The program also incentivizes good behavior, as inmates with 
disciplinary problems are denied access. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Directive No. 4500, 
supra note 144, at 1. 
147 Id. at 3. 
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the results overwhelmingly illustrate the benefits for children, inmates, and 
the state interests at play.148  However, the program is a privilege, not a 
right.  It is available to a small proportion of children with incarcerated 
parents—even within New York state, only eleven of the more than sixty 
correctional facilities offer the Family Reunion Program.149
New York state’s Bedford Hills, the only maximum security prison for 
women in the state, is a model of what a children’s rights approach to 
visitation might look like.
 
150  To start, Bedford Hills is located just forty 
miles from New York City and is accessible by public transportation.  
Geography is significant because over sixty percent of inmates in New 
York state prisons come from the New York City metropolitan area, but 
most of the state prisons, including the largest prison holding women, are 
located much further away.151
Bedford Hills became a national leader in incarcerated parent–child 
relationships when it created a prison nursery program for women who are 
pregnant when they enter prison.
  The state makes no provision for placing 
parents in facilities close to their home at the time of arrest.  However, at 
least one prison in New York state serves as a counterpoint. 
152  And Bedford Hills’ visitation program 
has long been recognized as one of the country’s most progressive.153
 
148 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Fiorica, Note, How the Constitution Can Preserve the Strength 
of Existing Familial Bonds and Foster New Relationships Between Female Inmates and 
Their Children, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 49 (2007) (describing the range of visiting 
programs and their impact on familial bonds); Rachel Wyatt, Note, Male Rape in U.S. 
Prisons: Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 579, 597 (2006) 
(considering the relationship between conjugal visits and sexual violence in prisons); see 
also supra notes 
  
12–13. 
149 Laughlin, supra note 88, at 223; NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 13, at 8; N.Y. 
Dep’t of Corr. Serv., Facility Listing, http://www.docs.state.ny.us/faclist.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
150 Across the country, most parenting programs and child-friendly visitation programs 
that do exist are in women’s prisons.  Elise Zealand, Protecting the Ties that Bind from 
Behind Bars: A Call for Equal Opportunities for Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children to 
Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 247, 256 (1998). 
151 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERV., UNDER CUSTODY REPORT: PROFILE OF INMATE 
POPULATION UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 2009, at 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2009/UnderCustody_Report_2009.pdf.  New 
York state does provide a free bus service that provides families of inmates with limited 
access to prisons that are otherwise inaccessible via public transportation, however in 
practice the service is infrequent and inaccessible.  NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 13, at 
4. 
152 Nicole S. Mauskopf, Note, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison 
Nurseries, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 101, 107–10 (1998); see also Note, Development in 
Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1921–44 (1998) (discussing 
the ambivalence amongst policy makers towards prison nursery programs). 
153 BLOOM & STEINHART, supra note 5, at 52. 
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Bedford Hills also operates a Parenting Center that helps mothers maintain 
contact and arrange visits with their children.  The facility has a large 
visiting room, part of which is dedicated to a Children’s Center, a visiting 
area designated exclusively for mothers and children.154  The Children’s 
Center staff also organizes a “summer program” where children from New 
York City visit every day for a week and engage in a range of group 
activities.155  However, these visiting opportunities are not available in most 
of New York’s other prisons, and many states have nothing comparable.156
Parental incarceration in the federal system presents a bleaker reality 
for the children left behind.  Though as a matter of policy “[t]he Bureau of 
Prisons encourages visiting by family . . . to maintain the morale of the 
inmate and to develop closer relationships between the inmate and family 
members,”
  
Thus, while the staff, volunteers, and inmates at Bedford Hills have done 
much to improve the quality of access children have to their incarcerated 
mothers, the prison and its program’s sui generis nature highlights the fact 
that most children in New York state and across the country are denied 
meaningful access to their incarcerated parents. 
157 in practice promoting visitation is not a priority.  The Bureau 
of Prisons maintains 115 facilities spread across the United States.158  Even 
if a sentencing judge requests that an inmate be sent to a prison near her or 
his family, the Bureau of Prisons need not comply with that request once 
the inmate is in its custody.159
In practice, most children of federal inmates do not maintain active 
contact with their incarcerated parents.  In 2004, 59% of parents in state 
 
 
154 Id.; Heidi Rosenberg, Comment, California’s Incarcerated Mothers: Legal 
Roadblocks to Reunification, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 313–14 (2000). 
155 Rachel D. Costa, Comment, Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep: A Look at Overnight 
Visitation Rights Available to Incarcerated Mothers, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 67, 94 (2003). 
156 See BLOOM & STEINHART, supra note 5, at 53 (“Few state correctional systems can 
boast of mother–child programming that is as comprehensive and nurturing as the Bedford 
Hills program.”). 
157 28 C.F.R. § 540.40 (2010). 
158 Bureau of Prisons, About the Bureau of Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/about/index.jsp 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
159 Interview with Nancy Gertner, Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 26, 2010).  Even if and when the Bureau of 
Prisons wants to determine an inmate’s location based on children or family considerations, 
it is much easier to do so for men than for women because of the greater number of male 
facilities.  Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female 
Offenders, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 18 (2005); see also Froehlich v. State Dep’t of Corr., 196 F.3d 
800, 802 (1999) (“[W]e do not think that accommodation of family needs is a duty that the 
U.S. Constitution imposes on state prison officials . . . .”).  The key question here is why is 
the Bureau of Prisons not required to consider children and family location regardless of 
whether or not the judge requests special placement. 
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correctional facilities and 45% of parents in federal correctional facilities 
reported never having had a personal visit from their children, and less than 
15% received visits at least once a month.160  While numerous personal 
factors might help explain this lack of contact after parental 
incarceration,161 there are simple structural and policy explanations as well.  
For example, 62% of parents in state correctional facilities and 84% of 
parents in federal facilities were incarcerated more than 100 miles from 
their place of residence at arrest; only 15% of parents in state facilities and 
about 5% of parents in the federal system were within fifty miles of their 
place of residence at arrest.162  Moreover, prison administrative guidelines 
may actively deter visitation,163 and often prisons do not have visiting 
facilities that are child-friendly.164
Even if and when children are able to make the long trip to their 
parents’ prison, the visiting conditions they find are highly variable.  For 
example, in the federal Bureau of Prisons each warden may establish a 
unique visiting schedule at his or her institution,
  Clearly, children’s rights and access to 
their incarcerated parents are not a significant factor in choosing where to 
build prisons or where to house individual inmates. 
165 provided each inmate is 
allowed “a minimum of four hours visiting time per month.”166  Prison 
wardens are required to dedicate a portion of the visiting room “to provide 
facilities for the children of visitors”167 but only “[i]f space is available.”168
 
160 SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 
  
“Despite the negative impact of maternal separation on young children, 
21, at 7 tbl.6.  In addition, 21% of state inmates and 9% 
of federal inmates reported never having visits, phone calls, or mails from their children.  Id. 
161 Some parents do not want to receive visits, some caregivers do not want or cannot 
arrange for visits, some children resist efforts to arrange visits or misbehave after them, some 
parents may be transferred to out of state facilities, some prisons may be inaccessible with 
public transportation, and so on.  Barbara J. Myers et al., Children of Incarcerated Mothers, 
8 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 11, 16 (1999). 
162 SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 21, at 8. 
163 See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 05.03.140, PRISONER VISITING 
(2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_140_ 
210434_7.pdf (providing a ten-page list of caveats and limitations on visits from family 
members, including children).  Note that there is tremendous variation in visiting policies 
and conditions between the states and federal system, between the various state systems, and 
even within individual state systems.  To date, there is no comprehensive jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction comparative analysis of visiting policies and conditions across the country. 
164 See, e.g., Myers et al., supra note 163, at 16 (reporting that some inmates do not want 
their children to visit because of poor visiting conditions). 
165 28 C.F.R. § 540.42 (2010). 
166 Id. at § 540.43. 
167 It is unclear why the C.F.R. language focuses on children of visitors rather than 
children of inmates themselves. 
168 28 C.F.R. § 540.41 (2010). 
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relatively few programs foster the mother–child bond.”169  Thus, the 
recognition of children and family visitation as positive170
V. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 
 does not derive 
from, or lead to, any particular rights on behalf of children to access their 
incarcerated parents. 
While international law and principles may not be binding within the 
United States,171 they are nonetheless relevant to domestic constitutional 
law.  Notwithstanding the efforts of a movement called “exclusive 
sovereigntism” to “buffer the United States from foreign influences,”172 the 
jurisdictional interaction of international law with national and local law 
has produced significant changes in U.S. constitutional interpretation.173  
Indeed there are numerous examples of how international legal documents, 
foreign law, and transnational experiences have influenced U.S. law.174  The 
process and possibilities for constitutional “cross-fertilization” have been 
well-documented elsewhere175
 
169 Raeder, supra note 160, at 17. 
 and are beyond the scope of this Article.  
The point here is simply that international law, norms, and practice, 
including those detailed supra, can be of use in reframing or reinterpreting 
constitutional rights in the United States. 
170 See also AM. PRISON ASS’N, A MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 342 (1954); 
COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 88 (1981); DANIEL GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON 
AND PAROLE SYSTEM 366 (1964). 
171 See Setear, supra note 38. 
172 Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 33 
(2007). 
173 Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1594–95 (2006) (“[W]hile 
aspects of the concept of dignity are implicit in the U.S. Constitution’s commitment to 
liberty, equality, and other personal rights, the Constitution does not use the term.  Given the 
era in which the Constitution was written, that absence is not surprising.  During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dignity was not considered to be an attribute of all 
persons but was, in Western nations, reserved for nobility.  However, as is detailed 
elsewhere, three hundred years of revolutionary ideology about the rights of individuals, the 
role of governments, and popular sovereignty succeeded in expanding the categories of 
persons understood as having dignity.”) (internal citations omitted). 
174 Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1926 (2003). 
175 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000) (setting 
forth five categories of transnational judicial interaction); see also Gerald L. Neuman, 
Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1863 
(2003) (examining and categorizing factors influencing legal interactions across national and 
international levels). 
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This Article has shown that current law and practice in the United 
States fail to take into account the interests or rights of children in 
sentencing and incarcerating their parents.  Children are rarely a factor in 
sentencing or visitation policy even if and when the best interests of the 
children require ongoing contact and support from their parents.  Select 
international and foreign law demonstrates that the international community 
has made greater strides in factoring the best interests of the child and 
children’s rights into decisions regarding incarcerated parents than the 
United States has done thus far. 
This Part presents the central argument of this Article as a solution to 
the legal exclusion problems that children with incarcerated parents face: it 
puts forward First Amendment associational rights and a due process liberty 
interest in familial integrity as domestic constitutional bases for factoring 
children of the incarcerated into sentencing and visitation policy.  Next, it 
engages weaknesses and counter-arguments.  Finally, it sketches the 
practicalities and policy implications of the argument.  Some of the 
constitutional arguments put forward here have been rejected or ignored by 
the Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, especially informed by the international 
and foreign law outlined in Part III, they are valuable aspirational 
approaches rooted in U.S. constitutional law. 
A. FIRST AMENDMENT 
Lawyers, judges, and lawmakers should recognize children’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of association with their incarcerated parents.  
Framing the issue of associational rights as a prisoners’ rights issue—as has 
been the norm in much previous litigation—instead of a children’s rights 
issue may have a significant impact on the outcome of a given case.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision on prison visitation, Overton v. 
Bazetta, has been widely cited for the proposition that “freedom of 
association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration,”176
 
176 Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003); see, e.g., Warren v. Pennsylvania, 316 
Fed. Appx. 109, 113 (3d. Cir. 2008); Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 (D.P.R. 2005). 
 
while the decision is silent on children’s First Amendment rights to a 
relationship with their parents.  The unanimous ruling in Overton upheld 
Michigan Department of Corrections’ policies severely restricting 
visitation, including visitation by children, and even the elimination of non-
106 CHESA BOUDIN [Vol. 101 
contact visits.177  The Sixth Circuit had upheld Michigan’s efforts to 
eliminate contact visits,178 but found that the restrictions on non-contact 
visits went too far and were unrelated to legitimate penological goals.179  
The Supreme Court’s reversal, refusing to uphold even the limited grounds 
on which the Sixth Circuit had based its opinion, was a definitive 
affirmation of a long line of jurisprudence upholding limitations on 
visitation and prisoners’ rights.180
In Overton, as in most cases,
 
181 the key issues were framed as 
prisoners’ rights rather than children’s rights, despite the fact that the 
original suit was filed on behalf of inmates and their prospective visitors.182
 
177 Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.  In reaching this conclusion the Court relied heavily on the 
four-factor Turner test.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  But see, e.g., Marsha M. 
Yasuda, Note, Taking a Step Back: The United States Supreme Court’s Ruling in Overton v. 
Bazetta, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1831 (2004) (criticizing Overton’s application of the Turner 
test). 
  
This Article calls for an inversion of the traditional framework: challenges 
178 Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1997). 
179 Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002). 
180 See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (holding that inmates 
do not have a liberty interest in receiving visitors that is entitled to the protections of the Due 
Process Clause); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (finding a jail’s blanket 
prohibition on contact visits to be constitutionally valid); Macedon v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 67 
Fed. App’x 407 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment against an inmate’s challenge 
of denial of family visits); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (leaving 
visitation regulations to prison administrators); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (“Prison inmates have no absolute constitutional right to visitation.”); Ford v. 
Beister, 657 F. Supp. 607, 611 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 589); Laaman v. 
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (allowing curtailment of visitation as 
punishment but recognizing First Amendment limits); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 
674 (D. Nev. 1975) (“So long as there are reasonable alternative means of communication, a 
prisoner has no First Amendment right to associate with whomever he sees fit.”).  But see 
Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding jail’s policy of forbidding 
weekend visitation and preventing visits by minors to be unlawful); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 
F. Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982) (rejecting a policy that prevented children under the age 
of fourteen from visiting their jailed parents); Valentine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. 294 
(D.N.J. 1979) (holding that county jail procedures totally barring visitation by inmates’ 
children are unconstitutional). 
181 But see King v. Caruso, 542 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that 
termination of spouse’s rights to visit her incarcerated husband did not violate her First 
Amendment right to freedom of association); Hernandez v. McGinnis, 272 F. Supp. 2d 223 
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that a three-year suspension of inmate’s visitation rights did not 
violate inmate or his family’s right to freedom of association, due process, or constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
182 Bazetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 815 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, there was an amicus brief filed on behalf of the sons and 
daughters of the incarcerated.  Brief of the Sons and Daughters of the Incarcerated as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees Seeking Affirmance of the District Court Ruling, 
Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 01-01635), 2001 WL 34787107. 
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should be brought in the name of children left behind, children who have 
not been convicted of a crime and therefore cannot be similarly deprived of 
the full protection of the Bill of Rights.183
The Court has considered the bi-directional nature of First Amendment 
rights in the prison context.  In Procunier v. Martinez, the Court found 
  Freedom of association is, by 
definition, a two-way street involving more than one party; freedom to 
associate requires associating with someone else. 
no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual’s right to free speech 
survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is at hand.  In the case of direct 
personal correspondence between inmates and those who have a particularized interest 
in communicating with them, mail censorship implicates more than the right of 
prisoners.184
The reasoning of the Court in Martinez clearly illustrates the 
disadvantages to approaching First Amendment rights based claims from 
the perspective of the prisoner.  However, in subsequent cases the Court has 
been hesitant to “forge a separate standard for cases implicating the rights 




183 The argument might similarly be made on behalf of spouses or other family members 
of inmates.  However minor, dependent children are likely particularly vulnerable and in 
need of protection given the negative outcomes associated with parental incarceration.  See 
Denise Johnston, Effects of Parental Incarceration, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED 
PARENTS, supra note 
  Thus, since 
Martinez, even when litigators frame their challenges in the name of non-
inmates whose rights are implicated by prison policy, courts tend to focus 
on the prisoner’s rights only.  However, no case mandates that courts ignore 
the rights of non-prisoners implicated by prison policy and indeed ignoring 
these rights seems a strained approach to the First Amendment that raises 
the question of how far could prison policies go in restricting non-prisoners’ 
rights. 
1. 
184 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974). 
185 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411 n.9 (1989) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817 (1974)); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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A long line of Supreme Court doctrine extends the First Amendment to 
family relationships.186  When Martinez and its progeny are read together 
with Overton’s declaration that “[m]any of the liberties and privileges 
enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner,”187 it should 
be apparent that there is a need for a new framework.  The argument here is 
that children of prisoners, whose constitutional rights are necessarily 
implicated in sentencing, placement, and visiting opportunities of their 
incarcerated parents, have a stronger basis for bringing suit than the 
prisoners themselves. 
Martinez defined a two-part test in cases in which prison regulations 
may justifiably implicate the free speech rights of non-prisoner citizens: 
“First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
expression . . . .  Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must 
be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular 
governmental interest involved.”  The Court subsequently decided to avoid 
clarifying the Martinez test in the context of a prisoner marriage 
prohibition,188 and since then it has preferred to employ a lower 
reasonableness standard from Turner v. Safley.189  However, the Turner 
reasonableness test is generally applied to prisoners themselves, and the 
goal here is to move toward a stricter standard of review through a 
children’s rights approach.190
 
186 See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) 
(“The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or 
private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.”); 
Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (“The Court has long recognized that, 
because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the 
formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial 
measure of sanctuary . . . .”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have 
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is 
constitutionally protected.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(extending constitutional protections to begetting and bearing of children); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (recognizing fundamental constitutional rights to family 
relationships); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding that 
education and child-rearing are protected by the Constitution). 
 
187 Overton, 539 U.S. at 131. 
188 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987); see also Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 (applying 
the Turner reasonableness test).  
189 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413–14. 
190 Presumably, any non-convict third party would have a stronger First Amendment 
basis for a challenge but the focus here is on children whose unique and dependent 
relationship with their parents might justify application of a particularly strict standard of 
review. 
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B. DUE PROCESS 
Children with incarcerated parents also have a due process liberty 
interest in the maintenance of their family integrity.191  Since the New Deal 
Era, courts have referred to “substantive due process” as the basis for 
extending unenumerated fundamental rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.192  
Substantive due process has been the basis for establishing a wide range of 
fundamental rights including reproductive rights,193 the right to marry a 
person of a different race,194 a right to engage in sexual relations with 
partners of the same sex,195 the right to travel,196 and more.  Even if there is 
no substantive due process liberty interest for family to visit a prison or for 
prisoners to receive visits,197 children’s interest in a relationship with their 
parents should survive.198  According to the Court, the primary relationship 
between parent and child “is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition.”199  Four key cases develop a constitutional right to 
family integrity: Moore v. City of East Cleveland;200 Smith v. OFFER;201 
Santosky v. Kramer;202 and Troxel v. Granville.203
 
191 See generally Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to 
Family Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301–02, 310 (2007) (outlining a doctrinal due process right to family 
integrity). 
 
192 See, e.g., A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 502 (1935) 
(using the phrase “substantive due process” for the first time in Supreme Court history). 
193 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
194 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
195 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
196 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
197 Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1989); Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 
F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (D. Md. 1977), aff’d, 
588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). 
198 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 
1547 (10th Cir. 1993); Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 532–33 (7th Cir. 1992); Mayo, 867 
F.2d at 375.  Contra Froehlich v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“The separation of family members that ensues upon the lawful incarceration of one of them 
is not the destruction of the family, but merely an inevitable incident of incarceration; and no 
one yet has had the audacity to argue that imprisoning a person who has children or parents 
violates the Constitution—that only orphans and recluses can be imprisoned for committing 
crimes.”). 
199 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
200 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
201 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
202 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745. 
203 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).  
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First, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court affirmed a long 
line of cases that goes back to at least the 1920s204 and recognizes the 
special common law rights of parents and children.  The decision 
invalidated a zoning ordinance preventing extended relatives from living in 
the same home.205  In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall 
wrote that “if any freedom not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights 
enjoys a ‘preferred position’ in the law it is most certainly the family.”206
That same year, in Smith v. OFFER, the Court considered the state’s 
ability to remove children from a foster home where they had been living 
for more than a year.
  
The decision further entrenched the legal protection of family and even 
expanded it to include extended family. 
207  Although the Court found that the existing 
procedures for removal did not violate the due process rights of the foster 
families or the foster children, Justice Brennan reasoned that “the 
importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to 
the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the 
intimacy of daily association.”208  Courts should not permit prisons 
incarcerating parents to deprive needlessly children of “the intimacy of 
daily association.”  Lower courts have also recognized a First Amendment 
right of association, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,209 
in the context of children visiting incarcerated parents;210 yet children 
whose parents are sent to prison are not provided with any process, much 
less a process that could survive constitutional scrutiny.211
Santosky v. Kramer built on Moore and Smith and further extended the 
right to family integrity.  Santosky was a custody case concerning the 
standard of proof required to demonstrate parental unfitness such as to 
legitimize placing children in foster care.  The Court found two state 
  The right to 
association and the liberty interest in the maintenance of a family together 
form a legal basis for demanding an expanded recognition of children’s 
interests in sentencing, visitation, and beyond. 
 
204 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing a parent’s due process liberty 
interest in establishing a home and bringing up children). 
205 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
206 Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
207 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) 
208 Id. 
209 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF Rights 183–86 (1998). 
210 Nicholson v. Choctaw Cnty., Ala., 498 F. Supp. 295, 310 (S.D. Ala. 1980); O’Bryan 
v. Cnty. of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 598–99 (E.D. Mich. 1977).   
211 See also Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (holding 
that children have a constitutional due process right to representation in abuse and neglect 
proceedings to protect their fundamental liberty interest in the integrity of their family 
relationship). 
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interests at stake: “a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the 
welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the 
cost and burden of such proceedings” and a powerful parental interest in the 
maintenance of family integrity.212
As described above, children’s rights—both in the United States and 
internationally—are generally considered through a “best interests of the 
child” analysis.  In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a statute that allowed courts to grant a third party visitation 
rights against the parent’s wishes if doing so was in the best interests of the 
child.
  Santosky is significant in the context of 
a right to family integrity because it expanded the traditional family right 
beyond just parents to parents and children. 
213  According to the Court, “so long as a parent adequately cares for 
his or her children . . . there will normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the family.”214  In his dissent in Troxel, 
Justice Scalia squarely teed up and then chose not to suggest a definitive 
resolution on the issue at the heart of the argument here: he noted that the 
respondent asserted “only, on her own behalf, a substantive due process 
right to direct the upbringing of her own children, and is not asserting, on 
behalf of her children, their First Amendment rights of association or free 
exercise.”215  Although the Court did not further develop the issue Justice 
Scalia flagged, it did acknowledge that the liberty interest of the parent–
child relationship “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by th[e] Court.”216  In other cases, the Court has had the 
“unanimous view that ‘few consequences of judicial action are so grave as 
the severance of natural family ties.’”217
Where it has been established that maintenance of a relationship with 
the parent is in a child’s best interests, the state should assume a parens 
patriae obligation to intervene in criminal justice proceedings of the parent 
on behalf of the child.  Thus, as in the international law outlined in Part III, 
  Taken together, these cases 
demonstrate the progression of the Court’s recognition of a constitutional 
due process liberty interest in family integrity.  That right, at least as it 
pertains to children, should not stop at the prison gate. 
 
212 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982); see also John C. Duncan Jr., The 
Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to 
Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1257–58 n.99 (2005). 
213 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000).  
214 Id. at 68. 
215 Id. at 93 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
216 Id. at 65; see also, Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right 
of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 
(1994) (reviewing Supreme Court First Amendment family doctrine). 
217 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787). 
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the state would approach criminal processing of parents with a balancing 
test to resolve competing interests: the interests of society to punish crime 
and increase public safety; the best interests of the child of the offender; and 
the interests of the victim in seeing the perpetrator punished.  This approach 
ensures that all parties whose rights and interests are directly implicated 
will be factored into the outcome. 
C. ENGAGING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
As with any innovative approach, there are weaknesses and counter-
arguments to the children’s rights approach to parental incarceration 
advocated here.  A child’s First Amendment right to familial association 
and due process liberty interest in family integrity are not absolute.  Clearly, 
these rights are regularly limited in the context of incarceration.218
First, some might argue that family ties already have been amply 
factored into various stages of the criminal justice process.  Professor Dan 
Markel, a leader in the field of criminal law, sentencing, and retribution, 
contends that “[m]embers of state-recognized families fare better 
throughout the system, which is designed quite self-consciously to make 
sure defendants with families will get benefits that others will not.”
  This 
section engages three related counter-arguments to expanding the role and 
rights of children in the context of parental incarceration. 
219  He 
argues elsewhere that a variety of laws form a string of “family ties 
benefits” which pervade the criminal justice system.220  According to this 
perspective, any further incorporation of children’s rights, as advocated 
here, would at best be redundant and at worst actually incentivize crime.221  
However, the idea that some discount in sentencing or access to a child-
friendly visiting room would incentivize crime should be absurd on its face. 
It is elementary logic that criminals do not expect to be caught; otherwise, 
they would not commit crimes.222  Although Markel’s publications are 
chock full of concrete examples of ways in which family can influence 
criminal justice outcomes, they are not persuasive here.223
 
218 See supra Part IV.  
  The fact that the 
219 MARKEL, supra note 133, at 19. 
220 Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1147, 1199 (2007). 
221 Id. 
222 See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 9, 11 (1999) (concluding that harsh mandatory sentences have little effect on 
crime). 
223 In fact, Markel does not argue against recognizing children’s rights.  Rather, he is 
concerned primarily with challenging the narrow definitions of “family” that harm non-
traditional care-giving units. 
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concept of family is already incorporated into the criminal justice system in 
various places—either through statutory rights and procedures, or through 
voluntary services provided haphazardly and unevenly—in no way justifies 
the criminal justice system’s failure to consider the rights of children in 
sentencing and visitation.  In fact, the recognition of family ties elsewhere 
highlights its crucial importance in the context of dependent minor children 
who risk losing their parents through no fault of their own. 
Second, a related counter-argument is simply that criminal justice 
proceedings should not be driven or influenced by third parties.  As Markel 
puts it, a “person who commits a crime can reasonably foresee that, if 
prosecuted and punished, his punishment will affect not only himself but 
also his family.”224  This argument might continue: criminal proceedings 
are between the state and the offender and allowing other parties to join the 
table is a slippery slope with no clear cut-off point.  This logic also fails.  
Victims or their families are already guaranteed a voice at various stages of 
the criminal justice process,225 and more than thirty states have a victim’s 
rights amendment in their state constitutions.226  Moreover, just as it is 
wrong for a crime to harm the victims, it is wrong that the punishment for 
that crime should harm innocent children.  While advocates of the counter-
argument may suggest that the harm to the children of a person convicted of 
a crime serves as a deterrent, it also feeds into a broader cycle of 
intergenerational incarceration227
Third, some may argue that incorporating children’s rights into 
sentencing or visitation policies will introduce unjust discrepancies in 
outcomes for otherwise similarly situated offenders.  Significant 
discrepancies have in fact been the result in widely cited cases such as 
 that may ultimately increase crime rather 
than deterring it.  Finally, as a matter of policy it would be irrational to 
approach criminal justice issues in a vacuum when it is possible to consider 
and account for all the key stakeholders in the process: victims, children, 
families, and communities.  Surely, this country’s legal system is 
sophisticated enough to approach criminal justice law and policy with a 
holistic perspective that both provides an appropriate, if limited, role to 
those most directly impacted and takes a broad, long-term view of societal 
interest, by, among other things, reducing future criminal behavior. 
 
224 MARKEL, supra note 133, at 49. 
225 See supra text accompanying notes 95–98, 102, 105. 
226 Rachel King, Why a Victim’s Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: 
Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 359 (2000). 
227 See infra note 243. 
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United States v. Johnson,228 where two defendants were convicted of the 
same crime but received disparate sentences because one of them was the 
mother of four dependent children.  Factoring children into the process 
“facilitate[s] ad hoc disparities between offenders who are otherwise 
similarly situated across cases, it also creates inequalities between persons 
involved in the very same cases.”229  Indeed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984230 created the USSC to, among other things, examine and eliminate 
“unwarranted disparity in federal sentencing policy.”231  But having minor 
dependent children is a real factor that has implications not only for the 
children themselves and the offender, but also for society as a whole.232
D. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
The simple reality, as the Second Circuit recognized in Johnson, is that 
sentencing a non-parent to prison generally has few grave social 
implications, while sentencing a mother and active caretaker for four young 
children to prison does.  In fact, no one would seriously suggest that 
sentencing and prison conditions should be determined solely on the basis 
of the facts of the crime committed.  Even the Guidelines require 
incorporation of prior criminal record and other relevant factors.  Why 
should innocent children who face losing their primary caregiver and 
potentially being transferred to state custody not be a relevant factor as 
well?  Children have a First Amendment right to association; they also have 
a due process liberty interest in maintaining family integrity.  These rights 
should apply with equal vigor in the context of parental incarceration. 
The argument here is not for a particular sentencing statute or 
visitation standard.  Rather, it is for the progressive, incremental realization 
of children’s rights in the context of parental incarceration.  Nonetheless a 
few policy specifics may help to illustrate the legal argument.  Whether 
 
228 United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).  The case is cited in forty-six 
law review articles.  This number was obtained by using the LEXIS online Shepardization 
function. 
229 MARKEL, supra note 133, at 49. 
230 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, ch. II (1984). 
231 LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: 
BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 13 (2007). 
232 See supra Part II.  
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through incremental impact litigation233 and the courts, or through 
legislative initiative, eventually, if the theory put forward here is successful, 
the outcome might look something like the following: Lawmakers would 
fund a wide range of non-carceral punishments tailored to specific classes 
of crime: treatment for addicts; intensive community service for vandals; 
reparations for thieves; Global Positioning Satellite monitoring of gang 
members, and so forth.  These programs tend to be significantly cheaper 
than incarceration and cause fewer third-party harms to children and 
families.234  These alternatives to incarceration would be available 
sentences at judicial discretion and not limited only to parents.  Where 
public safety requires incarceration, the best interests of the child235 might 
suggest shorter sentences than under the current regime, and prison 
facilities located in areas easily accessible from urban centers.  Public 
transportation236 would facilitate access to existing remotely located 
facilities.  Visitation facilities and prison programming would be improved 
to facilitate the best interests of the child.  The prison nursery and children’s 
center in Bedford Hills might become a statutory norm rather than a 
discretionary exception.  Incarcerated parents might be required to enroll in 
continuing education courses and parenting classes.  Overnight visiting and 
furlough programs could be considerably expanded to allow for the 
maintenance of family bonds and ease the transition to freedom at the end 
of prison terms.  Some judges may already implement some of these 
recommendations unilaterally,237
 
233 Impact litigation involves bringing cases designed to affect large numbers of people 
and impact social policy rather than simply settling the disputes of individual litigants.  An 
incremental approach to impact litigation was, perhaps, most famously and successfully 
employed in the line of cases that led to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (describing the long-term litigation 
strategy that made Brown possible). 
 but the argument here is for a systematic 
approach through statute or USSC Guidelines to establish a balancing test 
like that set out by Justice Sachs in South Africa.  All of these changes 
234 See generally Nora v. Demleitner, Replacing Incarceration: The Need for Dramatic 
Change, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2009) (advocating alternatives to incarceration). 
235 This standard is already well-established in the United States. See, e.g., Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 84 (2000) (noting that “myriad other state statute’s and court 
decisions at least nominally” apply the best interest of the child standard) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
236 For example, special buses set up and subsidized by the department of corrections to 
provide families of prisoners with access. 
237 See Gertner, supra note 129. 
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could save untold millions of tax dollars, ease prison crowding, and fulfill 
children’s rights.238
Sentencing judges would engage in balancing designed to “promote 
uniformity of principle, consistency of treatment, and individualisation of 
outcome.”
 
239  First, all sentencing judges would determine whether a given 
convicted person is a primary caregiver.  Next, if the person is a primary 
caregiver and is facing incarceration under the existing guidelines, the judge 
would evaluate the likely impact on the child or children, and consider what 
steps might be necessary to ensure the children’s best interests are 
adequately protected during incarceration.  Where appropriate, advocates 
could be appointed to represent children’s interests in legal proceedings.  
Finally, in deciding what specific sentence to order, the judge would 
consider not only the guidelines, the victim impact statement, the prior 
criminal history, and the details of the offense, but also the best interests of 
the child.240  The proposed process is multifaceted, but it is one that judges, 
who engage in complex balancing and multifaceted analysis regularly, are 
well-suited to handle.241
When and if primary caregiver parents are sentenced to prison and it is 
in the best interests of the child to maintain or develop a relationship with 
them, the law should require certain minimum standards.  Bedford Hills 
serves as a model, though certainly not all prisons would be required to 
meet that high standard.  The Bureau of Prisons or state department of 
corrections should simply facilitate phone calls, written communication, 
and visitation.  Visiting facilities should provide contact and interactive, 
child-appropriate spaces.  Children should not be forced to travel hundreds 
of miles to see their parents.  To the extent possible, in light of the 
individual offender’s security status and other relevant factors, overnight 
visitation, furloughs, and simulations of real-life family interactions should 





238 See, e.g., THE RISING COSTS OF INCARCERATION: CRIMINAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS, 
URBAN STRATEGIES COUNCIL (2007) (detailing the costs of incarceration per inmate and its 
impact on state budgets) available at http://www.urbanstrategies.org/programs/csj/ 
documents/CostsofIncarcerationFlyer_08.06.07_BH.pdf.  
 and break the cycle of intergenerational incarceration 
239 S v. M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
240 The specific outcome of this approach would vary.  A clearer, simpler test focused 
more narrowly on children’s rights to the exclusion of other factors would simply require 
that a primary caregiver of a dependent children not be sentenced to prison unless required 
by public safety considerations and then only for the minimum appropriate time. 
241 If, in this context, judges fail to factor children into the sentencing determination, that 
failure should be grounds for appeal. 
242 See MACDONALD & KELLY supra note 146. 
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potentially impacting millions of American youth.243  These visiting 
programs should not be a rare privilege doled out selectively as is current 
practice.  Rather, child-friendly visitation opportunities should be based on 
Constitutional rights of children to intimate association and family integrity 
with their incarcerated parent.244
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The recognition of children’s rights in the context of parental 
incarceration may be a long way from realization.  Nonetheless, there are 
concrete proposals and promising developments that warrant brief mention 
here.  Advocacy groups in the United States have promoted an aspirational 
document called a “bill of rights” for children with incarcerated parents.245
Legislative action is another approach to the realization of children’s 
rights to a relationship with their incarcerated parents.  In January 2010, 
with broad bipartisan support, the New Jersey Legislature passed a historic 
package of bills seeking to reduce recidivism rates, protect children of 
prisoners, and break the cycles of recidivism and intergenerational 
incarceration.
  
While the proposal is far from being binding law, this Article has argued 
that many of the principles in the bill of rights for children with incarcerated 
parents may have legal basis in the Constitution.  Over time, perhaps, 
impact litigation and judicial interpretation could expand and entrench the 
legal basis theorized here. 
246  For example, the Women and Families Strengthening Act 
establishes a commission to strengthen bonds between incarcerated parents 
and their children and encourages incarcerated individuals to be placed in 
facilities as close as possible to family.247
 
243 JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS 
OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 2 (2005); Johnston, supra note 
  The Act also lifts the ban on food 
stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits for 
51, at 138; Keva M. Miller, 
The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging Need for Effective 
Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 472, 478 (2006); Nkechi Taifa & 
Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look 
Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009). 
244 The right could be further developed through a statute with a built-in cause of action 
to more readily allow for judicial enforcement. 
245 SAN FRANCISCO PARTNERSHIP FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS, CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS: A BILL OF RIGHTS (2003), available at 
http://www.fcnetwork.org/Bill of Rights/billofrights.pdf; see also Tanya Krupat, Invisibility 
and Children’s Rights: The Consequences of Parental Incarceration, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 39 (2007) (describing the “Bill of Rights” initiative). 
246 Chris Megerian, N.J. Assembly Passes Bills Aimed at Curbing Recidivism, NJ.COM, 
Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/01/ 
nj_assembly_approves_bills_aim.html. 
247 Women and Families Strengthening Act, A.B. 4197, 2nd Sess. (N.J. 2009). 
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individuals who have felony drug convictions and dependent children.248
This Article has argued for the recognition of children’s right to a 
relationship with their parents in the context of criminal justice.  A 
comparative analysis of the New York state and federal sentencing and 
visitation policies demonstrated that the status quo criminal justice system 
is largely sanitized of the needs and interests of children.  When and where 
children are taken into consideration, it is discretionary, as a matter of 
privilege rather than of right.  The approach mapped out here has vast 
implications for sentencing guidelines, prison visiting conditions, the 
outcome of cases such as Overton, the political geography of prison 
construction, and more.  What is called for is nothing less than adding a 
new dimension to the way law and policy approach the administration of 
criminal justice. 
  
While these steps by the New Jersey legislature do not address the specific 
problems or legal issues raised in this Article, they represent a major 
advance for children of prisoners and suggest the possibility of legislating 
an expanded role for children in the criminal justice proceedings of their 
parents. 
 
248 Id. 
